One last time, we lifelong White Sox fans pause to remember that the 2005 Chicago White Sox are now immortal, like Da Bears and Jordan's six teams. Barring another miracle, Mark, Freddy, Jon, Jose, Orlando, Bobby, Dustin, Cliff, Neil, Damaso, Luis, AJ, Chris, Paul, Tadahito, Juan, Joe, Pablo, Willie, Scott, Aaron, Jermaine, Carl, Frank, Timo, Geoff, and Ross, you'll all be remembered as long as there is baseball in Bridgeport.
Goodbye, Orlando, Damaso, Luis, Aaron, and Geoff, you're gone now, on to new teams as part of the annual retooling. Adios also to Timo and Willie, victims of the windshield of salary escalation and their own performance. Farewell (probably) to Frank Thomas, the brightest star in a century-plus of ChiSox baseball.
Hellos to Javier, Rob, and Jim, and also to Brandon and Brian (although we've met quite a bit before), the reinforcements brought in.
Here's hoping you, too, can become part of the new panorama.
Friday, December 23, 2005
Saturday, December 17, 2005
Javier Self a Merry Little Christmas
Item: White Sox reportedly trade El Duque, Luis Vizcaino, and Chris Young for Javier Vazquez and a lot of cash. This deal is still unannounced last I checked due to physical exams and, possibly, MLB needing to approve the cash part. (When is the last time the commissioner didn't?)
Javier Vazquez displaces El Duque and Brandon McCarthy as the supposed fifth starter in the rotation, at least for now. The deal placed a lot of pressure on Jose Contreras and Jon Garland to come to terms on an extension, keeping the pitching staff together. At last report, Contreras is the most likely to cave first. When the music stops, whoever doesn't sit in Chair Number Five gets traded, and not necessarily to a favorable ballpark (How about Tampa Bay, Jon? Or Texas more your style?)
Vazquez, obviously, is the ex-Expo phenom who suffered an epic collapse in 2004 in the second half of the season as a Yankee and then turned in a pedestrian effort in 2005 for the D-Backs. The question for Vazquez is how much of his performance suffered from the combination of substandard defensive teams and uninspired coaching. Those won't be problems with the White Sox. His propensity for giving up fly balls in worrisome in the Cell, of course. But he is certainly an upgrade over El Duque in what's-left ability and in health status, and while overpaid, as a back of the rotation starter he's a very good pitcher.
Vizcaino and El Duque were roster filler at this point in their careers for the White Sox. Vizcaino's role was essentially mop-up relief, and El Duque's healthy history means he can't be projected to put up 200 innings ever again. Certainly El Duque served an important role in the 2005 team, but you can't get all sentimental and assume he'd do it again.
Giving up Chris Young may turn out to be prohibitively expensive. "May". Young turned in a monster power season as a youngster at Birmingham, a park which kills home run hitters. His 26 homers probably repesent about 25% fewer than he'd have hit if the Barons played in a neutral ballpark. One problem for Young was contact -- he strikes out a lot -- and maybe the White Sox have become a little gunshy since the Borchard experiment, but still, a five-tool outfielder with that kind of pop could turn out to be a real find. If Young shows he can hit for average and play center field, the White Sox may regret the trade. If he ends up a .260-hitting corner outfielder with power and 60 walks a year (Carlos Lee), they won't, really. You can't compare Young to Jeremy Reed statistically because they are so different, but I remember the gnashing of teeth over Reed's being traded for Garcia, which resembled the gnashing over Young last week. I doubt any White Sox fans regret that deal now after Garcia's duel with Backe in the championship clincher; if they do, well, I suggest they should re-examine what they think is important in a baseball season.
Further, if the White Sox use the little auction they're having to lock in Contreras and if he can maintain his improvment, and if they can flip Garland's incredible season into a star position player like Blalock or Tejada or a handful of high-level prospects, the White Sox may never miss Young.
If they don't, another possibility is this gives the White Sox more than an excuse to put McCarthy in the Charlotte pantry long enough to set his career money clock back one more year and a five-deep rotation that could be among the most feared in baseball history. That alone may be the key to the deal, in the long run.
Javier Vazquez displaces El Duque and Brandon McCarthy as the supposed fifth starter in the rotation, at least for now. The deal placed a lot of pressure on Jose Contreras and Jon Garland to come to terms on an extension, keeping the pitching staff together. At last report, Contreras is the most likely to cave first. When the music stops, whoever doesn't sit in Chair Number Five gets traded, and not necessarily to a favorable ballpark (How about Tampa Bay, Jon? Or Texas more your style?)
Vazquez, obviously, is the ex-Expo phenom who suffered an epic collapse in 2004 in the second half of the season as a Yankee and then turned in a pedestrian effort in 2005 for the D-Backs. The question for Vazquez is how much of his performance suffered from the combination of substandard defensive teams and uninspired coaching. Those won't be problems with the White Sox. His propensity for giving up fly balls in worrisome in the Cell, of course. But he is certainly an upgrade over El Duque in what's-left ability and in health status, and while overpaid, as a back of the rotation starter he's a very good pitcher.
Vizcaino and El Duque were roster filler at this point in their careers for the White Sox. Vizcaino's role was essentially mop-up relief, and El Duque's healthy history means he can't be projected to put up 200 innings ever again. Certainly El Duque served an important role in the 2005 team, but you can't get all sentimental and assume he'd do it again.
Giving up Chris Young may turn out to be prohibitively expensive. "May". Young turned in a monster power season as a youngster at Birmingham, a park which kills home run hitters. His 26 homers probably repesent about 25% fewer than he'd have hit if the Barons played in a neutral ballpark. One problem for Young was contact -- he strikes out a lot -- and maybe the White Sox have become a little gunshy since the Borchard experiment, but still, a five-tool outfielder with that kind of pop could turn out to be a real find. If Young shows he can hit for average and play center field, the White Sox may regret the trade. If he ends up a .260-hitting corner outfielder with power and 60 walks a year (Carlos Lee), they won't, really. You can't compare Young to Jeremy Reed statistically because they are so different, but I remember the gnashing of teeth over Reed's being traded for Garcia, which resembled the gnashing over Young last week. I doubt any White Sox fans regret that deal now after Garcia's duel with Backe in the championship clincher; if they do, well, I suggest they should re-examine what they think is important in a baseball season.
Further, if the White Sox use the little auction they're having to lock in Contreras and if he can maintain his improvment, and if they can flip Garland's incredible season into a star position player like Blalock or Tejada or a handful of high-level prospects, the White Sox may never miss Young.
If they don't, another possibility is this gives the White Sox more than an excuse to put McCarthy in the Charlotte pantry long enough to set his career money clock back one more year and a five-deep rotation that could be among the most feared in baseball history. That alone may be the key to the deal, in the long run.
Saturday, December 10, 2005
Crystal Ball
The White Sox 2006 roster should be capable of defending the division title, although the division will be tougher than its was. The long term prognosis is really ugly, I think. Because of idiotic teams like the Mets and Blue Jays raising the going rate for pitching mediocrity to almost ten million dollars and, by inference, skyrocketing the price of quality pitching, the White Sox' rotation will simply be too expensive to keep together beyond 2006-7.
Kenny's core strategy, assembling dominant starting pitchers at relative bargain prices, is not sustainable.
Black Betsy will want to point out that trading pitching prospects by the basket doesn't help this situation, and he's partially right; the problem (and you can ask any Texas Ranger fan to confirm this) is that from 10 Gios and Haigwoods, you have an even chance of getting one Freddy Garcia, and you need a handful to play the 2005 White Sox' game.
As for the rest of the division, the Indians' offseason depends on Millwood, I think, as they've struck out badly in everything since the Byrd signing. I don't see that they've gotten either better or worse. In any case, the Indians are basically as good as the White Sox, although if they'd just fix their corner positions they'd dominate. The problem is, as smart as Shapiro is, he has a blind spot, and doesn't get that Aaron Boone is a terrible ballplayer.
When I first saw that the Twins got Castillo, I shuddered. Castillo is a massive upgrade over everybody the Twinks have played at second for years, probably since Knoblauch. They are working on their third base hole, and probably plan to replace Jones with the gimpy guy (Kubel?), and allegedly are looking for one of the old broken down guys (Thomas, Piazza) to replace Matt LeCroy at DH. (How did HE get through waivers?) There is, though, a case for believing that Castillo will decline sharply in Minnesota, that being that he's basically an infield singles hitter, and that the FieldTurf may turn a lot of his slow rollers into outs. I'm not holding my breath.
The Tigers continue their steady march toward mediocrity, and have reached the point they can be a real pain in the neck to the contending teams, but not the point they can contend. Polanco and Shelton and Bonderman are good players, but the team is weighed down by several ridiculous has-beens with gigantic contracts. They continued to add to their collection of misfit toys with Kenny "Assault and Battery" Rogers.
I revel in the Royals' badness, their continuing penance (in my book) for their decade dominating the old A.L. West partly through the cheap trick of an unplayable ballfield that confused and disoriented visiting teams and gave them dozens of cheap victories over visitors that would have crushed them on grass. (Don't believe me? Check out the Royal record in the first games of home series from 1975-1990..)
Kenny's core strategy, assembling dominant starting pitchers at relative bargain prices, is not sustainable.
Black Betsy will want to point out that trading pitching prospects by the basket doesn't help this situation, and he's partially right; the problem (and you can ask any Texas Ranger fan to confirm this) is that from 10 Gios and Haigwoods, you have an even chance of getting one Freddy Garcia, and you need a handful to play the 2005 White Sox' game.
As for the rest of the division, the Indians' offseason depends on Millwood, I think, as they've struck out badly in everything since the Byrd signing. I don't see that they've gotten either better or worse. In any case, the Indians are basically as good as the White Sox, although if they'd just fix their corner positions they'd dominate. The problem is, as smart as Shapiro is, he has a blind spot, and doesn't get that Aaron Boone is a terrible ballplayer.
When I first saw that the Twins got Castillo, I shuddered. Castillo is a massive upgrade over everybody the Twinks have played at second for years, probably since Knoblauch. They are working on their third base hole, and probably plan to replace Jones with the gimpy guy (Kubel?), and allegedly are looking for one of the old broken down guys (Thomas, Piazza) to replace Matt LeCroy at DH. (How did HE get through waivers?) There is, though, a case for believing that Castillo will decline sharply in Minnesota, that being that he's basically an infield singles hitter, and that the FieldTurf may turn a lot of his slow rollers into outs. I'm not holding my breath.
The Tigers continue their steady march toward mediocrity, and have reached the point they can be a real pain in the neck to the contending teams, but not the point they can contend. Polanco and Shelton and Bonderman are good players, but the team is weighed down by several ridiculous has-beens with gigantic contracts. They continued to add to their collection of misfit toys with Kenny "Assault and Battery" Rogers.
I revel in the Royals' badness, their continuing penance (in my book) for their decade dominating the old A.L. West partly through the cheap trick of an unplayable ballfield that confused and disoriented visiting teams and gave them dozens of cheap victories over visitors that would have crushed them on grass. (Don't believe me? Check out the Royal record in the first games of home series from 1975-1990..)
Kings of the Mountain
A quick roster analysis for the 2006 defending World Series champions... A few NRIs to be named later could upset the applecart a bit, especially at the back end of the bullpen.
Positions
As everybody points out, we don't know how many pitchers they'll carry, probably 12 as a baseline, which squeezes out Willie Harris and, probably, Timo Perez. The "questionable" list doesn't include anybody with minor-league options left. One advantage to carrying a Jerry Owens on the roster is he can be optioned regularly as part of the pitching load balancing act.
On paper, the offense has returned to the level it was at in 2004.
Positions
- Locks (11): Paul Konerko, Tadahito Iguchi, Juan Uribe, Joe Crede, Scott Podsednik, Jermaine Dye, Jim Thome, A. J. Pierzynski, Chris Widger, Rob Mackowiak, Pablo Ozuna
As everybody points out, we don't know how many pitchers they'll carry, probably 12 as a baseline, which squeezes out Willie Harris and, probably, Timo Perez. The "questionable" list doesn't include anybody with minor-league options left. One advantage to carrying a Jerry Owens on the roster is he can be optioned regularly as part of the pitching load balancing act.
On paper, the offense has returned to the level it was at in 2004.
- Locks (8): Mark Buehrle, Jose Contreras, Neal Cotts, Freddy Garcia, Jon Garland, Dustin Hermanson, Bobby Jenks, Cliff Politte,
Anywhere
Near the end of the winter meetings, the White Sox traded Damaso Marte back to the Pirates for lefthanded-hitting supersub Rob Mackowiak. A good deal, as long as the White Sox aren't forced to over-use Mackowiak.
Marte had worn out his welcome over the last two years, both with marginal pitching (all those walks) and, reportedly, off-the-field hissy fits. As a second lefthanded reliever (I hesistate to use the words "setup man" with the White Sox, whose bullpen use is more creative than that), Marte was likely to see 40-60 innings again, making him a brutally expensive player. Trading him back to the organization the White Sox obtained him from brought an interesting, unique player.
Mackowiak is nominally a third baseman, but has seen 232 games in right, 167 at third, 110 in center, 59 at second, 46 in left, and even 5 at first base. His defensive statistics look below-average but acceptable in center and at second, and average at the other positions. This makes him acceptably versatile (being suitable for six positions in the lineup), and therefore one heck of a bench player.
As a hitter, he's also one heck of a bench player, and could fill in as an interim regular without crippling the team, but he's basically a lefthanded Joe Crede. This makes him an upgrade in terms of both versatility and effectiveness over the past Sox bench players, and provides effective insurance that the White Sox lacked in 2005.
One comment often made about the 2005 Series champs was how lucky they'd been, but the real luck was that the serious injuries they did suffer to key players (Frank Thomas, El Duque) were covered adequately in places the team had some depth. Injuries to Podsednik and Crede, neither offensive dynamos, weren't adequately covered, contributing to the late-August, early-September doldrums, because the 2005 bench simply wasn't all that hot. The 2006 bench is already looking better, as Mackowiak is a better ballplayer than any of the 2005 crew.
Marte had worn out his welcome over the last two years, both with marginal pitching (all those walks) and, reportedly, off-the-field hissy fits. As a second lefthanded reliever (I hesistate to use the words "setup man" with the White Sox, whose bullpen use is more creative than that), Marte was likely to see 40-60 innings again, making him a brutally expensive player. Trading him back to the organization the White Sox obtained him from brought an interesting, unique player.
Mackowiak is nominally a third baseman, but has seen 232 games in right, 167 at third, 110 in center, 59 at second, 46 in left, and even 5 at first base. His defensive statistics look below-average but acceptable in center and at second, and average at the other positions. This makes him acceptably versatile (being suitable for six positions in the lineup), and therefore one heck of a bench player.
As a hitter, he's also one heck of a bench player, and could fill in as an interim regular without crippling the team, but he's basically a lefthanded Joe Crede. This makes him an upgrade in terms of both versatility and effectiveness over the past Sox bench players, and provides effective insurance that the White Sox lacked in 2005.
One comment often made about the 2005 Series champs was how lucky they'd been, but the real luck was that the serious injuries they did suffer to key players (Frank Thomas, El Duque) were covered adequately in places the team had some depth. Injuries to Podsednik and Crede, neither offensive dynamos, weren't adequately covered, contributing to the late-August, early-September doldrums, because the 2005 bench simply wasn't all that hot. The 2006 bench is already looking better, as Mackowiak is a better ballplayer than any of the 2005 crew.
Thursday, December 08, 2005
Tomorrow Never Knows
Frank Thomas was refused arbitration yesterday, almost certaining ending his long White Sox career. Predicatably, as it always happens with older athletes who refuse to quit, Frank is angry, bitter, and resentful. Always optimistic, Frank expects to be healthy next year and contribute significantly -- like he did ten years ago, when he wasn't 38 years old.
I think the truth is Frank thinks he needs 500 homers to lock in his Hall Of Fame credentials. Because of the twin negatives of DH-ness and an injury-riddled last half of his career, many observers feel that Frank falls just short of a Hall of Fame career. I suspect Frank believes that and is still looking for some more counting numbers.
The problem is, if he puts up some mediocre numbers, he'll damage people's memories, and be remembered by the HOF voters as an old, slow slugger. I think he'd do better to hang them up, and spend the next five years quietly reminding the world how he wasn't chemically assisted during his tenure, and should be judged that way, being the elder statesman he has earned the right to be.
It's always disappointing when a premier athlete overstays his time, like a great actor taking a bit part on a TV show. Or think of the train wreck that was Life With Lucy (Lucille Ball) trying to recapture that magic from the 1950s. That's what I think of a 38-year-old Frank Thomas bouncing around the hotel selling himself as healthy and ready to contribute. Sure, it's possible he'll put up some nice numbers and be healthy for a full year. It's also possible he'll get elected the next Nevada senator. Just don't bet on either.
If Frank doesn't want to become part of the Minnie Minoso post-retirement PR machine for the White Sox quite yet, and somebody wants to pay him several million bucks not to, I'm fine with that. But let's be realistic, the odds are, he'll break something else and that will be that.
I think the truth is Frank thinks he needs 500 homers to lock in his Hall Of Fame credentials. Because of the twin negatives of DH-ness and an injury-riddled last half of his career, many observers feel that Frank falls just short of a Hall of Fame career. I suspect Frank believes that and is still looking for some more counting numbers.
The problem is, if he puts up some mediocre numbers, he'll damage people's memories, and be remembered by the HOF voters as an old, slow slugger. I think he'd do better to hang them up, and spend the next five years quietly reminding the world how he wasn't chemically assisted during his tenure, and should be judged that way, being the elder statesman he has earned the right to be.
It's always disappointing when a premier athlete overstays his time, like a great actor taking a bit part on a TV show. Or think of the train wreck that was Life With Lucy (Lucille Ball) trying to recapture that magic from the 1950s. That's what I think of a 38-year-old Frank Thomas bouncing around the hotel selling himself as healthy and ready to contribute. Sure, it's possible he'll put up some nice numbers and be healthy for a full year. It's also possible he'll get elected the next Nevada senator. Just don't bet on either.
If Frank doesn't want to become part of the Minnie Minoso post-retirement PR machine for the White Sox quite yet, and somebody wants to pay him several million bucks not to, I'm fine with that. But let's be realistic, the odds are, he'll break something else and that will be that.
Wednesday, November 23, 2005
Thome, can you hear me?
The White Sox today traded Aaron Rowand and two minor leaguers to the Phillies for Jim Thome and enough money to re-stock Fort Knox. The two minor leaguers are apparently Gio Gonzalez and Daniel Haigwood, who are lefthanded pitchers and top-ten prospects. What this means for the Konerko re-signing effort, I don't know; rumor has it the Orioles have entered the bidding with a really stupid gesture.
Internet analysts have mostly gone ballistic on the Thome trade. They quite properly focus on Thome's health history, and also on the insanity of parting with two highly regarded prospects.
On the last one, well, give me a break.
In acquiring Freddy Garcia, Carl Everett, Royce Clayton, Bartolo Colon, and Roberto Alomar, the White Sox parted with:
Why is it that we should believe that Gio Gonzalez and Daniel Haigwood will come back to haunt Kenny?
Internet analysts have mostly gone ballistic on the Thome trade. They quite properly focus on Thome's health history, and also on the insanity of parting with two highly regarded prospects.
On the last one, well, give me a break.
In acquiring Freddy Garcia, Carl Everett, Royce Clayton, Bartolo Colon, and Roberto Alomar, the White Sox parted with:
- Jeremy Reed, who started in center for the Mariners last year and played poorly,
- Miguel Olivo, who played his way off the Mariners and is now in San Diego,
- Michael Morse, who was busted for steroids and is a marginal player with Seattle,
- Frank Francisco, who threw a chair at a fan in Oakland, narrowly avoided prosecution, and is currently rehabbing an injury that cost him a season
- Josh Rupe, who is a borderline middle relief prospect with the Rangers,
- Anthony Webster, who can't get out of A ball
- Gary Majewski, a decent setup pitcher with Washington
- Jon Rauch, who can't stay healthy with Washington
- Edwin Almonte, who spilled his cup of coffee and is back in AA ball
- Royce Ring, who is a marginal reliever with the Mets,
- Andrew Salvo, who is in the independent leagues now,
- Brad Murray, who is out of baseball,
- Rocky Biddle, who didn't pitch last year, and
- Jeff Liefer, who got stuck in a bathroom in AAA ball.
Why is it that we should believe that Gio Gonzalez and Daniel Haigwood will come back to haunt Kenny?
Saturday, November 19, 2005
Sounds of Silence
While there has been some player movement in the past week, very little of it has been all that interesting. The big questions for the White Sox are no more answered than they were at the start of the month.
Comings (and stayings):
Comings (and stayings):
- Chris Widge has been resigned, and so has Pablo Ozuna, to modest contracts, to reprise their bit player roles.
- Chris Stewart effectively replaces Raul Casanova and Jamie Burke (now with the Rangers system) as the third string catcher option. Stewart was added to the 40-man roster.
- OF Chris Young was added to the roster. Young is fresh off a good AA campaign. He seems to be fast, have prodigious power,walks a lot, but does strike out a lot and "only" hit .277.
- Charles Haeger was added to the roster. Young pitcher with a knuckleball. Don't hold your breath waiting for him.
- Daniel Haigwood was added to the roster. Young power pitcher with Brandon McCarthy like number so far.
- Jerry Owens was added to the roster. Owens is a speed-oriented project player. Get on base, no power, gets caught stealing a lot.
- Geoff Blum has taken a modest contract offer from the Padres to go home to southern California. Blum obviously will be remembered by White Sox fans for his miraculous Tito-F-Landrum-esque solo homer in the 14th inning of Game Three, but, beyond that, he did little last year except provide insurance against Joe Crede's finger injury becoming a crisis.
- Carl Everett was bought out and is definitely gone.
- Kevin Walker is mercifully gone.
- Paul Konerko hasn't signed anywhere. The news is pretty dead, which makes me think his agent isn't seeing the offers he expected. The White Sox have left one spot on the 40-man roster open, which is presumably a slot for Paulie if he resigns before the Rule 5 draft.
- Frank Thomas the free agent is rehabbing. There is no telling what happens with him.
- The White Sox avoided a trap when the Cubs inexplicable overpaid Scott Eyre to be their LOOGY. Three years, $11MM? What?
Sunday, November 13, 2005
Elvis are you out there somewhere, looking like a happy man?
The key offseason questions for the White Sox seem to be:
- Obviously, what happens to Paul Konerko. Right now it seems to me (and I could be wrong) that the market for Konerko isn't what it was cracked up to be.
- Where will the payroll end up? Ticket price increases and better buzz would have seemed to pre-figure a rise, and Reinsdorf said payroll would go up... but rumors say a starting pitcher is on the block.
- Who will be the DH? Carl didn't really get it done, and there are plenty of possibilities... but what will happen? I think I might be able to predict what the White Sox will do, but the rest of baseball is populated by people with strange ideas.
- Can Bobby Jenks stay healthy for an entire season? What do they have there?
Obviously, the key question is who will be in the 3-4 spots in the order, and will getting him (them) involve breaking up the Big Four?
The wind is whistling... the wind is whistling through the house.
Saturday, November 12, 2005
At the One Lane Bridge...
So today the papers say that Paul Konerko's agent didn't actually get an offer from the White Sox during their "exclusive negotiating window", and that they prefer to let him collect offers from other teams first. The 4/54 offer much bandied about was fiction. Konerko's agent says that's just the way the White Sox prefer to do it.
Yesterday the Orange County newspaper said that the Angels would offer Konerko "at least four seasons and something more than $40 million", but that the Angels tend "not to deviate much from [the] initial offer". Konerko's agent said publicly that it would be in the Angels' "best interest to make a serious offer right away".
What this looks like is that the market is starting to wake up and back away from Paul Konerko. While Paulie was undeniably a great contributor to the 2005 White Sox, his career numbers and reputation do not say "superstar":
Yesterday the Orange County newspaper said that the Angels would offer Konerko "at least four seasons and something more than $40 million", but that the Angels tend "not to deviate much from [the] initial offer". Konerko's agent said publicly that it would be in the Angels' "best interest to make a serious offer right away".
What this looks like is that the market is starting to wake up and back away from Paul Konerko. While Paulie was undeniably a great contributor to the 2005 White Sox, his career numbers and reputation do not say "superstar":
- He hits a lot of home runs, yes, but his lifetime road numbers (.266/.333/.448) suggest strongly that he is in great part a creature of The Cell. His 774 OPS in Anaheim has to be a real burr for Stoneman's saddle.
- While he is an adequate defender, he's just that -- an adequate first baseman. Those aren't really in short supply.
- He's only two seasons removed from a disastrous, multi-month slump.
- Baseball is suffering from a huge epidemic of hangovers from ill-advised contracts to, well, first baseman/DH types.
Sunday, November 06, 2005
Angels, you don't want to go, down to Konerko
Speculation seems to have settled on Angels, Red Sox, D-Backs, and Mets as possible suitors for Paul Konerko.
For the Angels, all I can ask is, "Why?"
I somehow don't think the Angels' interest is genuine. I wonder if they are asking pro forma because they would like to drive up the White Sox' price out of pure spite over recent events.
Look at it this way... The Angels have lots of talent available to play 1B/DH over the next four of five years and not all of it has to succeed for them to be overstaffed. (That, and California's personal income tax is, what, seven percent higher than Illinois? That's worth three million there.) Casey Kotchman comes to mind, a good-to-great young lefthanded hitter. Baseball Prospectus forecasted Kotchman before the year with a WARP from 3.9 to 5.3 over the next few years, solidly better than Konerko.
Over the last few years, the Angels spent money on Guerrero, Colon, and Cabrera to fill holes in their roster they couldn't fill from within. When they felt that third baseman Dallas McPherson was ready, they let Glaus walk. By any reasonable estimation, 1B/DH isn't really a hole for them, not in the long term.
The Angels have the money to do almost anything, no matter how stupid, but they don't strike me as inclined to pay Paul Konerko as much or more than they are paying Vladimir Guerrero.
Mike Piazza is out there looking for a DH job, remember, and the Angels still have that Dodger inferiority complex to service, and Piazza's ability to be an emergency catcher (and his SoCal connection to that blue team) would be a plus for the Angels.
I think their interest isn't sincere. It doesn't make a lot of sense -- unless the idea is to keep Kenny busy, that is.
For the Angels, all I can ask is, "Why?"
I somehow don't think the Angels' interest is genuine. I wonder if they are asking pro forma because they would like to drive up the White Sox' price out of pure spite over recent events.
Look at it this way... The Angels have lots of talent available to play 1B/DH over the next four of five years and not all of it has to succeed for them to be overstaffed. (That, and California's personal income tax is, what, seven percent higher than Illinois? That's worth three million there.) Casey Kotchman comes to mind, a good-to-great young lefthanded hitter. Baseball Prospectus forecasted Kotchman before the year with a WARP from 3.9 to 5.3 over the next few years, solidly better than Konerko.
Over the last few years, the Angels spent money on Guerrero, Colon, and Cabrera to fill holes in their roster they couldn't fill from within. When they felt that third baseman Dallas McPherson was ready, they let Glaus walk. By any reasonable estimation, 1B/DH isn't really a hole for them, not in the long term.
The Angels have the money to do almost anything, no matter how stupid, but they don't strike me as inclined to pay Paul Konerko as much or more than they are paying Vladimir Guerrero.
Mike Piazza is out there looking for a DH job, remember, and the Angels still have that Dodger inferiority complex to service, and Piazza's ability to be an emergency catcher (and his SoCal connection to that blue team) would be a plus for the Angels.
I think their interest isn't sincere. It doesn't make a lot of sense -- unless the idea is to keep Kenny busy, that is.
Sunday, October 30, 2005
Champions: Sympathy for the Beancounters
Why the statheads (and I) got it wrong comes down to two mistakes:
1) I misread the Go-Go PR as grand strategy, and missed the real point, like almost everybody else;
2) There is a difference between players like (say) AJ Pierzynski and players like Ben Davis, not just in their own performances, but in what they expect from and coax out of others
The Strategy
Conventional stathead analyses of baseball start with the assumption that wins and losses are directly a result of runs scored and allowed, following several formulas, the best known of which is Bill James’ Pythagorean formula.
My pet theory is that the obsession with grand totals and consequent averages (whether they be Equivalent or On Base) loses the key concept of standard deviation.
I believe the White Sox quite intentionally built a team with a relatively lower game-to-game deviation of runs scored and an intentionally wider deviation of runs allowed. Kenny was very public about this. I don't know that anybody ever really set out to do this (although the Twins stumbled into it for a couple of years), but I am pretty sure Kenny Williams is very aware of what he did, and I think it may be a surefire way to beat “Pythagoreas” because it invalidates the precept that runs are randomly distributed along the normal curve. The risk is you won’t score enough runs to win any games, a risk the White Sox flirted with in September but only then.
To understand my hypothesis, you have to realize that most pitchers with a 4.50 ERA don't allow 3 runs every 6 innings. They usually allow 1 or 2, punctuated by a 4 here and a 7 there, but not nearly as often. We see this happen all the time with rookie soft tossers for the other team and wonder why Joe Blow from Cuba Mo can shut the White Sox down. It's because that is in fact a pretty normal pattern. My hypothesis is you actually WANT pitchers who blow up once a month (we’ll call him Freddy Mercury) but otherwise dominate instead of one who is consistent (we’ll call him Steady Eddie Average), because the first class of pitcher will actually win more often despite having identical total and average statistics. Guys who blow up once a month are easier to find than guys who consistently put up mediocre numbers because most baseball teams are actually LOOKING for the pitcher who is consistently average and get frustrated with the Mercury types.
This grand strategy won't work if you bring in five relief pitchers a game, because you increase the probability than one of the middle guys will end up blowing the game, but it does work if your starters usually go 7. It only works for STARTING pitchers, who control the outcome of any given game more often than not.
Here's the thing -- this strategy works by leveraging guys who are undervalued by the market, a la Moneyball. It won't ever show up in computerized simulations because they all use a Monte Carlo model for pitching performance -- random numbers -- which assumes that a player is some permutation of his stat-generating-robot counterpart in cyberspace. He's not; he's a human being operating more or less at the edge of an infinitely sheer precipice of failure.
Baseball as viewed by Baseball Prospectus and the East Coast, is a war of attrition, like World War I, fought by artillery duels between huge sluggers driving in baserunners who often walked. The White Sox played a game more akin to precision air strikes and infiltration ground tactics. (Their latest book, Mind Game, does include a paragraph pointing out that Pythagoreas may be an oversimplification.)
We statheads missed because we didn’t understand that Kenny was looking to exploit one of the quirks of the game – that runs don’t carry over, that losing by a lot is no different than losing by a little. We confused what he was advocating with true, 1960s small ball, and because sabermetric orthodoxy tells us that this is a poor decision, we bought it. He couched it in go-go smallball terms as a PR move. Most White Sox fans believe in the holy trinity of pitching, speed, and defense. They let us project that onto what they were doing.
The Players
Last November 10th, I wrote an email to the WHITESOX mailing list bewailing the White Sox offseason strategy. What they were doing, it seemed to me, was insane. As it turned out, what they were ended up doing was the opposite of what I feared, while they hit the nail on the head for every single one of my “imaginings”.
First, to be fair, Kenny didn’t do all of it intentionally. He was saved from himself by the Giants adding a third season to Omar Vizquel’s offer. He was saved from himself by the Red Sox and other teams bidding up mediocre pitchers and ignoring the brittle but still cagey El Duque. He benefited from the Angels’ giving up on Bobby Jenks. He benefited from the Giants’ second mistake, releasing A. J. Pierzynski without a really good reason.
In early November, the White Sox had Ben Davis catching, no right fielder except perhaps Alex Escobar, no second baseman, no fifth starter, questionable 3 and 4 starters, and a bullpen with several very iffy characters. So what happened?
They dumped Carlos Lee for bullpen depth and official stathead dart board Scott Podsednik. I really thought at the time this was about freeing up money (which it was) and ridding the team of a problem personality (it was). It also gave the White Sox dual centerfielders, at the expense of some big-bang offense, and improved what I can only call the presence-of-mind on the field. Carlos was widely believed to be a stathound, the biggest one on the team.
After the Giants’ aforementioned brain freeze, they signed Jermaine Dye to fill the right field hole and Dustin Hermanson as an insurance policy for two spots. Dye was a risk given his injury history but not a terrific one. Hermanson was a career mediocrity, but one with the big-inning quirk I mentioned before. Then came Pierzynski, El Duque, and most shockingly, Tadahito Iguchi. What happened was a methodical upgrade of every major hole in the roster to at least an adequate player and, in almost every case, a good one.
They had clearly improved the defense without crippling the offense.
But it wasn't just that. It was also the fact that, with no exceptions, they added red asses. Of the additions, Dye was the closest thing to laid back. The rest of them wanted, more than anything else, to win. The image of 2005 is A. J. Pierzynski, by hook or by crook, getting 100% out of every situation. And, while character can't cover up a lack of talent, it can definitely get the most out of talent.
1) I misread the Go-Go PR as grand strategy, and missed the real point, like almost everybody else;
2) There is a difference between players like (say) AJ Pierzynski and players like Ben Davis, not just in their own performances, but in what they expect from and coax out of others
The Strategy
Conventional stathead analyses of baseball start with the assumption that wins and losses are directly a result of runs scored and allowed, following several formulas, the best known of which is Bill James’ Pythagorean formula.
My pet theory is that the obsession with grand totals and consequent averages (whether they be Equivalent or On Base) loses the key concept of standard deviation.
I believe the White Sox quite intentionally built a team with a relatively lower game-to-game deviation of runs scored and an intentionally wider deviation of runs allowed. Kenny was very public about this. I don't know that anybody ever really set out to do this (although the Twins stumbled into it for a couple of years), but I am pretty sure Kenny Williams is very aware of what he did, and I think it may be a surefire way to beat “Pythagoreas” because it invalidates the precept that runs are randomly distributed along the normal curve. The risk is you won’t score enough runs to win any games, a risk the White Sox flirted with in September but only then.
To understand my hypothesis, you have to realize that most pitchers with a 4.50 ERA don't allow 3 runs every 6 innings. They usually allow 1 or 2, punctuated by a 4 here and a 7 there, but not nearly as often. We see this happen all the time with rookie soft tossers for the other team and wonder why Joe Blow from Cuba Mo can shut the White Sox down. It's because that is in fact a pretty normal pattern. My hypothesis is you actually WANT pitchers who blow up once a month (we’ll call him Freddy Mercury) but otherwise dominate instead of one who is consistent (we’ll call him Steady Eddie Average), because the first class of pitcher will actually win more often despite having identical total and average statistics. Guys who blow up once a month are easier to find than guys who consistently put up mediocre numbers because most baseball teams are actually LOOKING for the pitcher who is consistently average and get frustrated with the Mercury types.
This grand strategy won't work if you bring in five relief pitchers a game, because you increase the probability than one of the middle guys will end up blowing the game, but it does work if your starters usually go 7. It only works for STARTING pitchers, who control the outcome of any given game more often than not.
Here's the thing -- this strategy works by leveraging guys who are undervalued by the market, a la Moneyball. It won't ever show up in computerized simulations because they all use a Monte Carlo model for pitching performance -- random numbers -- which assumes that a player is some permutation of his stat-generating-robot counterpart in cyberspace. He's not; he's a human being operating more or less at the edge of an infinitely sheer precipice of failure.
Baseball as viewed by Baseball Prospectus and the East Coast, is a war of attrition, like World War I, fought by artillery duels between huge sluggers driving in baserunners who often walked. The White Sox played a game more akin to precision air strikes and infiltration ground tactics. (Their latest book, Mind Game, does include a paragraph pointing out that Pythagoreas may be an oversimplification.)
We statheads missed because we didn’t understand that Kenny was looking to exploit one of the quirks of the game – that runs don’t carry over, that losing by a lot is no different than losing by a little. We confused what he was advocating with true, 1960s small ball, and because sabermetric orthodoxy tells us that this is a poor decision, we bought it. He couched it in go-go smallball terms as a PR move. Most White Sox fans believe in the holy trinity of pitching, speed, and defense. They let us project that onto what they were doing.
The Players
Last November 10th, I wrote an email to the WHITESOX mailing list bewailing the White Sox offseason strategy. What they were doing, it seemed to me, was insane. As it turned out, what they were ended up doing was the opposite of what I feared, while they hit the nail on the head for every single one of my “imaginings”.
First, to be fair, Kenny didn’t do all of it intentionally. He was saved from himself by the Giants adding a third season to Omar Vizquel’s offer. He was saved from himself by the Red Sox and other teams bidding up mediocre pitchers and ignoring the brittle but still cagey El Duque. He benefited from the Angels’ giving up on Bobby Jenks. He benefited from the Giants’ second mistake, releasing A. J. Pierzynski without a really good reason.
In early November, the White Sox had Ben Davis catching, no right fielder except perhaps Alex Escobar, no second baseman, no fifth starter, questionable 3 and 4 starters, and a bullpen with several very iffy characters. So what happened?
They dumped Carlos Lee for bullpen depth and official stathead dart board Scott Podsednik. I really thought at the time this was about freeing up money (which it was) and ridding the team of a problem personality (it was). It also gave the White Sox dual centerfielders, at the expense of some big-bang offense, and improved what I can only call the presence-of-mind on the field. Carlos was widely believed to be a stathound, the biggest one on the team.
After the Giants’ aforementioned brain freeze, they signed Jermaine Dye to fill the right field hole and Dustin Hermanson as an insurance policy for two spots. Dye was a risk given his injury history but not a terrific one. Hermanson was a career mediocrity, but one with the big-inning quirk I mentioned before. Then came Pierzynski, El Duque, and most shockingly, Tadahito Iguchi. What happened was a methodical upgrade of every major hole in the roster to at least an adequate player and, in almost every case, a good one.
They had clearly improved the defense without crippling the offense.
But it wasn't just that. It was also the fact that, with no exceptions, they added red asses. Of the additions, Dye was the closest thing to laid back. The rest of them wanted, more than anything else, to win. The image of 2005 is A. J. Pierzynski, by hook or by crook, getting 100% out of every situation. And, while character can't cover up a lack of talent, it can definitely get the most out of talent.
Wednesday, October 26, 2005
WS +3: The Best Of Times...
I admit I didn't stay up to see it, and I also admit saying an Aaron-Rowand-like "no way! No Way! NO WAY!" when checking the score this morning...
No way!
No way!
Sunday, October 23, 2005
WS +1: The Miseducation of Joe Sheehan
Instead of over-analyzing last night's game, instead I want to ask the question: How did the analysts, specifically Baseball Prospectus (BP), get the White Sox so wrong this year? Now, they have an answer, "luck", but that just doesn't wash given the incredible gap between what they said in their book this year and what actually happened. I think I have the answer, but explaining it takes some background.
First, you have to understand the history of sabermetrics a little bit. Sabermetrics is a term coined by Bill James to encompass the whole idea of studying questions about baseball using statistics. James didn't invent the concept, it's as old as baseball and Henry Chadwick keeping score in the 19th century. Many systems have been proposed over the years, from Earnshaw Cook's DX to Tom Boswell's Total Average to Pete Palmer's Linear Weights (LWTS) to Bill James' many metrics to BP's collection of formulas.
With that said, here's why BP screwed up:
Attitude. Bill James wrote books that were essentially academic papers. He would pose the question, describe the framework used to address the question in full (including formulas), attempt to answer the question, and then open the floor (conceptually) to objections and review. BP doesn't do this, really; their formulas are largely proprietary (because they make money selling information to many sources), and they don't really brook review of their methods or conclusions. BP's attitude is more Papal than academic, an attitude which leads to error through the age-old idea of hubris. The White Sox don't fit BP's concept of how to run a baseball team, so they must be bad. When their own formulas showed a better outcome than their guts, they went with their guts. When their formulas emitted transparently bizarre predictions, they stuck by their formulas, as long as they fit their assumptions.
Appearance of Conflict of Interest. Further, because the White Sox don't fit their concept (and presumably don't buy their private analysis products), they trashed them in public, which is analogous to the brokerage scandals of a few years back (but, admittedly, however, not harmful to the public in any way). The teams BP singles out for praise are, predictably, the teams that employ their authors and friends. As BP is largely a Chicago-born institution and the Chicago teams ignore them could be a cause for simple spite. Further, obviously success by any organization that doesn't follow the basic BP program could be perceived by the public as undermining the credibility of their otherwise entertaining and shrewd product.
Methodology. Plainly put, much of BP's work derives from Pete Palmer's work, and Palmer's methodology was, I believe, flawed by the basic, mistaken assumption that baseball is close enough to a linear process to be analyzed as such. James noticed early that baseball isn't linear, his formulas aren't linear, and his results were better. BP drank the Total Baseball Kool-Aid -- or we think they did; we'll never know because they don't really let us see their process. One example is the focus on replacement players, who are essentially strawmen; the goal is not to collect players better that AAA players, the goal is to win as often as possible.
Observability. Baseball has dozens of individual statistics that are collected at every level, and analyzed and over-analyzed. It also has dozens of events that happen on the field every game that go unrecorded because there's no statistic to cover them. It has no realistic way to distinguish intent. When a batter grounds to second to advance a runner to third base, no statistic is really kept, and if one were, no framework exists to evaluate it. BP's approach to this problem is age-ol, assuming that if we can't measure it, it must all even out in the end.
So, because they couldn't understand the Carlos Lee trade in their analytical framework, and couldn't account for the possibility that Jose Contreras' failures in Yankee Stadium not being correctable, and so on and so forth, BP allocated 82-odd wins to the White Sox, and Joe Sheehan predicted a 90-loss season for a team that has now won 107 games and counting and has a tenuous one-game lead in the World Series. When confronted time and time again with the fact that something went wrong in the system to make that grade of mistake, the responses amount to: (1) they were lucky, (2) they were lucky, (3) their luck will run out, and (4) they are really lucky. That excuse made the grade in May, BP, but now we're in late October and you need better ones.
The real answer is you can't predict run prevention because your defensive/fielding analysis is just as bad as everyone else's. For a business that makes money based on the promise that they can predict the future, that is what you call a severe downward indicator.
First, you have to understand the history of sabermetrics a little bit. Sabermetrics is a term coined by Bill James to encompass the whole idea of studying questions about baseball using statistics. James didn't invent the concept, it's as old as baseball and Henry Chadwick keeping score in the 19th century. Many systems have been proposed over the years, from Earnshaw Cook's DX to Tom Boswell's Total Average to Pete Palmer's Linear Weights (LWTS) to Bill James' many metrics to BP's collection of formulas.
With that said, here's why BP screwed up:
Attitude. Bill James wrote books that were essentially academic papers. He would pose the question, describe the framework used to address the question in full (including formulas), attempt to answer the question, and then open the floor (conceptually) to objections and review. BP doesn't do this, really; their formulas are largely proprietary (because they make money selling information to many sources), and they don't really brook review of their methods or conclusions. BP's attitude is more Papal than academic, an attitude which leads to error through the age-old idea of hubris. The White Sox don't fit BP's concept of how to run a baseball team, so they must be bad. When their own formulas showed a better outcome than their guts, they went with their guts. When their formulas emitted transparently bizarre predictions, they stuck by their formulas, as long as they fit their assumptions.
Appearance of Conflict of Interest. Further, because the White Sox don't fit their concept (and presumably don't buy their private analysis products), they trashed them in public, which is analogous to the brokerage scandals of a few years back (but, admittedly, however, not harmful to the public in any way). The teams BP singles out for praise are, predictably, the teams that employ their authors and friends. As BP is largely a Chicago-born institution and the Chicago teams ignore them could be a cause for simple spite. Further, obviously success by any organization that doesn't follow the basic BP program could be perceived by the public as undermining the credibility of their otherwise entertaining and shrewd product.
Methodology. Plainly put, much of BP's work derives from Pete Palmer's work, and Palmer's methodology was, I believe, flawed by the basic, mistaken assumption that baseball is close enough to a linear process to be analyzed as such. James noticed early that baseball isn't linear, his formulas aren't linear, and his results were better. BP drank the Total Baseball Kool-Aid -- or we think they did; we'll never know because they don't really let us see their process. One example is the focus on replacement players, who are essentially strawmen; the goal is not to collect players better that AAA players, the goal is to win as often as possible.
Observability. Baseball has dozens of individual statistics that are collected at every level, and analyzed and over-analyzed. It also has dozens of events that happen on the field every game that go unrecorded because there's no statistic to cover them. It has no realistic way to distinguish intent. When a batter grounds to second to advance a runner to third base, no statistic is really kept, and if one were, no framework exists to evaluate it. BP's approach to this problem is age-ol, assuming that if we can't measure it, it must all even out in the end.
So, because they couldn't understand the Carlos Lee trade in their analytical framework, and couldn't account for the possibility that Jose Contreras' failures in Yankee Stadium not being correctable, and so on and so forth, BP allocated 82-odd wins to the White Sox, and Joe Sheehan predicted a 90-loss season for a team that has now won 107 games and counting and has a tenuous one-game lead in the World Series. When confronted time and time again with the fact that something went wrong in the system to make that grade of mistake, the responses amount to: (1) they were lucky, (2) they were lucky, (3) their luck will run out, and (4) they are really lucky. That excuse made the grade in May, BP, but now we're in late October and you need better ones.
The real answer is you can't predict run prevention because your defensive/fielding analysis is just as bad as everyone else's. For a business that makes money based on the promise that they can predict the future, that is what you call a severe downward indicator.
Tuesday, October 18, 2005
World Series break: Pinch me!
We still don't know which team will face the White Sox in the Series, but we do know one thing: writers and analysts will mess up the comparison because they constantly forget that ERAs aren't comparable between the two leagues. An ERA in St. Louis of 3.60 is about the same as an ERA of 4.00 for an American League starter, and a Houston ERA of 3.50 is about the same as a 4.00 for a Chicago starter. The principal reasons for this all relate to the use of the DH, both in weakening the opposition starter and getting NL pitchers out of the game before they are completely gassed. The Astro and Cardinal pitching staffs are good, but their real numbers are significantly below the White Sox numbers.
Sunday, October 16, 2005
ALCS 3-1: In the a[la]rms of the Angels...
How many Angels can dance around like pinheads?
The Angels and some of their fans, as well as the Fox rally monkeys, would like you to believe that the only reason the Angels are the ones down 3-1 is blown calls by the umpires.
The fact is, though, that there's an element of old-fashion boneheadedness at work.
Consider the Finley double play last night. Here are the facts: the Angels had runners on first and third with one out. Steve Finley's bat hit A. J. Pierzynski's mitt during his swing, which the umpires did not notice, and Finley hit a grounder to Iguchi. Finley spent part of the time he was running to first half-turned to the home plate umpire pleading his case.
From the time that Finley hit the ball, there were three reasonable outcomes possible:
Then there were the two calls on the bases on Podsednik, which were both close and amounted to one insurance run.
The Fox-fueled controversy in Game Two has an equally simple three-plausible-outcomes scenario:
The Angels and Fox want you to believe that they haven't gotten a call in the series, which is not true, and I don't just mean the Iguchi neighborhood play last night. In Game One, the Angels got a huge break when the second-base umpire failed to call Orlando Cabrera out for interference on his rolling block on a DP. This caused Iguchi to throw the relay over Konerko's head and allowed the third run in a 3-2 game to score. The got a break in Game Two when much-vilified plate umpire Doug Eddings over-eagerly punched out Paul Konerko on a checked swing in the sixth with nobody out against Scot Sheilds and a 3-2 pitch without asking the first base umpire for help; replays showed (much more conclusively than in the Paul pitch) that he did not go around. The next batter, Carl Everett, was called out on a very low pitch. A runner on first with nobody out is a much more dangerous situation than with two out, and other than pointing out that the call was blown, Fox didn't play that up.
Personally, I hope the Angels keep it up. It means they think they've lost.
The Angels and some of their fans, as well as the Fox rally monkeys, would like you to believe that the only reason the Angels are the ones down 3-1 is blown calls by the umpires.
The fact is, though, that there's an element of old-fashion boneheadedness at work.
Consider the Finley double play last night. Here are the facts: the Angels had runners on first and third with one out. Steve Finley's bat hit A. J. Pierzynski's mitt during his swing, which the umpires did not notice, and Finley hit a grounder to Iguchi. Finley spent part of the time he was running to first half-turned to the home plate umpire pleading his case.
From the time that Finley hit the ball, there were three reasonable outcomes possible:
- The umpire could have called catcher interference, sending the runner on third back and loading the bases with out for Adam Kennedy in a 3-1 game. The expected number of runs from this scenario is 1.52, with 0 being possible.
- Finley could have run full-speed to first base, certainly beating Uribe's relay, while a run scored from third base, leaving a runner on first with two out and a run scored to make it 3-2. The expected number of runs from this scenario is 1.24, with the 1 being certain.
- Finley could do what he did, inning over, no runs scored.
Then there were the two calls on the bases on Podsednik, which were both close and amounted to one insurance run.
The Fox-fueled controversy in Game Two has an equally simple three-plausible-outcomes scenario:
- Pierzynski could have been called out on a clean catch. Despite Tim McCarver's incessant repetition, the "fact" that Jose Paul caught the strike on the fly was not conclusively established by the replay.
- Paul could have tagged Pierzynski, who stood there for an instant, ending the inning.
- Pierzynski gets first on the error.
The Angels and Fox want you to believe that they haven't gotten a call in the series, which is not true, and I don't just mean the Iguchi neighborhood play last night. In Game One, the Angels got a huge break when the second-base umpire failed to call Orlando Cabrera out for interference on his rolling block on a DP. This caused Iguchi to throw the relay over Konerko's head and allowed the third run in a 3-2 game to score. The got a break in Game Two when much-vilified plate umpire Doug Eddings over-eagerly punched out Paul Konerko on a checked swing in the sixth with nobody out against Scot Sheilds and a 3-2 pitch without asking the first base umpire for help; replays showed (much more conclusively than in the Paul pitch) that he did not go around. The next batter, Carl Everett, was called out on a very low pitch. A runner on first with nobody out is a much more dangerous situation than with two out, and other than pointing out that the call was blown, Fox didn't play that up.
Personally, I hope the Angels keep it up. It means they think they've lost.
Sunday, October 09, 2005
ALCS entrants: Wildest Dreams
It's been a long time since I rock 'n' rolled... writer's block.
All I can say now is, it's just gravy.
All I can say now is, it's just gravy.
Saturday, August 20, 2005
74-45: Cut the kids in half
A lot of people don’t understand it, but I think Thomas breaking his foot again was a terrible blow to the team, you know they haven’t been the same since. The GM and manager don’t get it, but if you read the quotes from the players, they definitely were playing April and May with abandon and the feeling that Frank would be back and help finish the job, and since his re-injury, the team has played a lot like the demoralized way they did last year after Magglio and Frank got hurt. Now with him gone and the inevitable nagging injuries, the ridiculous bench consisting of Pablo Ozuna, T.I.M.O., Geoff Blum, and Chris Widger is exposed, unable to contribute any meaningful offense, and the team sinks under the collective bilge they’ve accumulated.
The good news is books will be written about this season. The bad news is they will be gothic horror novels.
Saturday, July 30, 2005
67-35: Let me introduce you to the end
Between vacation, business travel, and a general lack of belief that anyone will ever read this, the Razor has lacked any motivation to blog... until now, with the end game in sight.
- Frank Thomas is done for the year and probably for his White Sox career after suffering yet another fracture of a bone in his left foot. This time, allegedly, it's the navicular, the same little bone that nags as Alex Escobar's career. It's too early to write the eulogy for his career, but let me say he was the best righthanded hitter of the 1990s, a clear Hall of Fame ballplayer, but he will probably have to sweat out his induction because of his lackluster defense at first and the permanent damage done to his career and reputation by his injuries, the relationship with former Sox manager Jerry Manuel, and the interplay between the two.
- The White Sox have taken the first two from the Orioles after that shocking news about Frank Thomas. El Duque pitched well, and the bullpen's been great, but the White Sox are definitely a Big Ball team right now, having put up 7 and 9 runs on the slumping Oriole pitching staff.
- The long slog 'til October has begun. I have to admit it is enormously entertaining to listen to the Minnesota Twins radio broadcasts as they fall further behind. Tonight, though, on ESPN, one writer commented that the Twins still believe they can catch the White Sox if they can just land Alfonso Soriano. Sure. They just lost again and are now 13 1/2 games back with 59 to play. The rumored trade is Bret Boone, J. C. Romero, and Kyle Lohse to the Rangers for Soriano. I hope it goes through, because it would sink the Twins and help Texas, a doubly good thing for a North Texas resident who is a White Sox fan.
Thursday, June 30, 2005
53-24: Everybody Have Fun Tonight
Johnny Mostil is headed for a much needed vacation beside a quiet lake in the middle of nowhere, but he goes on the vacation with his beloved Sox 29 games over .500 at 53-24 after 77 games after Freddy Garcia dominated the Detroit Tigers 6-1 on Thursday afternoon. The Sox head to Oakland with what Jim Baker in Baseball Prospectus called an 'unscre[w]able pooch'. And unscrewable it is -- no team has blown a 10-game lead in, well, forever. Even Torii Hunter conceded the race a few games ago.
So now comes the question: is the Jason Schmidt rumor the Chicago Tribune is promoting actually true? Now, Jason's having some trouble this year, but man, he is one hell of a pitcher and acquiring him would be the end of worrying about the Cubans.
The White Sox were 18-7 in June.
So now comes the question: is the Jason Schmidt rumor the Chicago Tribune is promoting actually true? Now, Jason's having some trouble this year, but man, he is one hell of a pitcher and acquiring him would be the end of worrying about the Cubans.
The White Sox were 18-7 in June.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)